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Abstract. This paper presents a cognitive agent model capable of showing situ-
ations where self-generated actions are attributed to other agents, as, for exam-
ple, for patients suffering from schizophrenia. The mechanism underlying the 
model involves inverse mirroring: mapping preparation states onto sensory re-
presentations of observed actions. It is shown how this mechanism can develop 
based on Hebbian learning. The model provides a basis for applications to hu-
man-like virtual agents in the context of for example, training of therapists or 
agent-based generation of virtual stories. 
Keywords: action attribution, cognitive agent model, schizophrenia. 
1    Introduction 
For the development of agent models as a basis for virtual agents in serious or nonse-
rious gaming, an often used criterion is that they show realistic human-like behaviour. 
One of the ways to obtain such human-like agent models is to exploit the fast growing 
amount of neurological literature, so that models are developed that have biological 
plausibility. In addition, to obtain realistic virtual agents, not only ideally functioning 
persons should be considered but also persons with deviant behaviour, in order to 
cover larger parts of the variety in types of behaviour as occurring naturally in the 
overall human population. This paper addresses an agent model for such naturally 
occurring deviant behaviour in attribution of self-generated actions to other agents. 
False attribution of self-generated (e.g., manual or verbal) actions to other agents is a 
common symptom occurring in patients with schizophrenia. One explanation put 
forward for the phenomenon that self-generated actions are not attributed to oneself is 
that self-attribution depends on prediction and monitoring of effects of these actions, 
and this does not function well for persons with schizophrenia; see, for example [6], 
[7], [9], [10]. However, in other work it is debated whether this is an appropriate ex-
planation. For example, in [8] experimental work is reported that indicates that differ-
ences in these respects between patients with schizophrenia and a control group are 
not very convincing. In [16] it is argued that a more important role is played by what 
is called ‘the sense of agency’ (which is at a more conscious, personal level) than 
action effect prediction and monitoring (which is at a unconscious, subpersonal level).  
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Note that the issue of not attributing a self-generated action to oneself, as ad-
dressed in the literature as mentioned above, is not the same as attributing such an 
action to another agent, as in order to create a mental image of somebody else per-
forming the action requires a shift from a representation of an action from a first-
person to a representation from a third-person perspective (mental rotation). Patients 
with schizophrenia do not only fail to attribute self-generated actions to themselves, 
they also attribute them to other agents (which can be real or imaginary). Using neu-
rological literature on mirroring [4], [14], [15], [20] and self-other differentiation [17], 
in this paper this form of false attribution to other agents is addressed. 
 In this paper, in Section 2 the ideas from the neurological literature are briefly dis-
cussed. In Section 3 the cognitive agent model is introduced. Section 4 presents a 
number of simulation results. In Section 5 a mathematical analysis is made. Finally, 
Section 6 is a discussion. 
2   The Cognitive Agent Model for False Attribution of Actions 
In this section the cognitive agent model and its detailed specifications are presented. 
First the modelling some background knowledge is briefly discussed, next the format 
used is briefly introduced, and the example scenario used is described, and finally the 
agent model is addressed in detail. 
 
Background knowledge. One of the recent neurological findings concerns the mir-
roring function of certain neurons; e.g., [4], [14], [15], [20]. Mirror neurons are  ac-
tive not only when a person prepares for a specific action or body change, but also 
when the person observes somebody else intending or performing this action or body 
change. This includes expressing emotions in body states, such as facial expressions. 
The idea is that these neurons and the neural circuits in which they are embedded play 
an important role in social functioning and in (empathic) understanding of others; e.g., 
[4], [14], [15], [20].  Their discovery is often considered a crucial step for the further 
development of the discipline of social cognition; cf. [15]. When states of other per-
sons are mirrored by some of the person’s own states that at the same time are con-
nected via neural circuits to states that are crucial for the person’s own feelings and 
actions (shared circuits), then this provides an effective basic mechanism for how in a 
social context persons fundamentally affect each other’s actions and feelings;  
e.g. [14].  
Mirroring involves a change of perspective from another agent (third person) to 
oneself (first person). This requires a nontrivial mental rotation transformation of the 
available representations (cf. [17]): sensory representations of observed actions of 
other agents are mapped onto representational structures for self-generated actions. 
Attribution a self-generated action to another agent is in fact a kind of reverse proc-
ess. It requires a change of perspective from preparation for a self-generated action 
(first person) to another agent (third person) perspective, based on a reverse mental 
rotation transformation of the available representations. In fact this is inverse mirror-
ing: the representational structures for self-generated actions are mapped onto sensory 
representations of observed actions of other agents, thus forming a mental image  
of somebody else performing the action. When it is assumed that such an inverse 
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mapping is made, a self-generated action is perceived as observed from a third person 
perspective, and thus it provides a mechanism for the self-generated action to be at-
tributed to another agent.  
A further question is how such a reverse mental rotation mapping can exist or de-
velop in a neurological context. One possibility is that the mechanism is there ini-
tially, due to improper genetics. However, another possibility is that it is developed 
during lifetime. This is also analysed below, assuming a Hebbian learning principle. 
This is the principle that connected neurons that are frequently activated simultane-
ously strengthen their connecting synapse. The principle goes back to Hebb [12], but 
has recently gained enhanced interest by more extensive empirical support (e.g., [2]), 
and more advanced mathematical formulations (e.g., [11]). In the models a variant of 
this principle has been adopted to realise an inverse mirroring connection from prepa-
ration of an action to sensory representation of a similar observed action. 
 
Modelling Format Used. To formalise the agent model in an executable manner, the 
hybrid dynamic modelling language LEADSTO has been used; cf. [3]. Within 
LEADSTO the dynamic property or temporal relation a → D b denotes that when a 
state property a occurs, then after a certain time delay (which for each relation in-
stance can be specified as any positive real number D), state property b will occur. 
Below, this D will be taken as the time step Δt, and usually not be mentioned explicit-
ly. Both logical and quantitative calculations can be specified, and a software envi-
ronment is available to support specification and simulation. In most cases in the 
model below some form of combination function f is used. A typical example of an 
update rule in LEADSTO is 
 
  SS(w1, V1) & SS(w1, V1) & SR(w3, V3)  →   SR(w3, V3 + γ [ f(ω1V1, ω2V2) – V3 ] Δt) 
 
which expresses that when the sensor states for w1 and w2 have values V1 and V2 respec-
tively and the sensory representation of w3 has value V3, then after time duration Δt this 
sensory representation will have value V3 + γ [ f(ω1V1, ω2V2) – V3 ] Δt. Here ω1 and ω2 are 
the connection strengths from the sensor states to the sensory representation, respec-
tively, and γ is an update speed factor. Moreover, f is a combination function, for 
which different choices can be made, for example,  
 
f(W1, W2) = β(1- (1-W1)(1-W2)) + (1 - β)W1W2   (0 ≤ β ≤1) 
 
In simulations with the agent model, a combination function f(W1, …, Wn)  based on a 
continuous logistic threshold function th(σ, τ, W) has been used of the form f(W1, …, 
Wn) =   th(σ, τ, W1 +… + Wn) (where σ is a steepness and τ a threshold value) with:  
th(σ, τ, W) =  ( ଵଵା ௘షσሺ ೈ ష τሻ  -  
ଵ
ଵା ௘στ ) (1 ൅ ݁ିστ) 
For higher values of στ this threshold function is approximated by the expression: 
th(σ, τ, W) = ଵ1൅ ௘െσሺ ܹ െ τሻ 
Example Scenario. The designed agent model will be illustrated for the following 
scenario. A sensed stimulus s1 leads to a sensory representation of this stimulus, 
which in turn triggers preparation and execution of an action b as a response of the 
agent; see the causal chain in the lower part of Fig. 1. Moreover, when another agent 
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performs action b, this is represented as a stimulus s2 that can be sensed; see upper 
part of Fig. 1. The sensory representation srs(s2) indicates the mental image of another 
person performing the action. The agent’s mirroring capability is based on the as-
sumption that an activated sensory representation of s2 will also activate the agent’s 
own preparation for b. This assumption has been confirmed in neurological literature 
such as [4], [14], [15], [20]. When this latter chain of events happens (i.e., whenever 
mirroring takes place) , for the model introduced here it is assumed that by Hebbian 
learning this will strengthen the connection from preparation of b to sensory represen-
tation of s2 (observed action), thus developing inverse mirroring capabilities. When 
such a learning process has achieved  substantial connection strength, the agent’s 
response on stimulus s1 has changed. When s1 is sensed (in the absence of s2), not 
only will the agent trigger preparation and execution of action b as before, but in addi-
tion it will generate a mental image of another agent performing action b (the sensory 
representation srs(s2)), thus creating a third person perspective on the action.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the cognitive agent model 
Table 1. State properties used 
notation description notation description 
WS(s) world state for s PS(b) preparation state for b 
SS(s) sensor state for s ES(b) execution state for b 
SRS(s) sensory representation state of s cs(ω) strength of connection ω (from preparation 
of b to sensory representation of s2) 
 
Detailed Specification of the Agent Model. In the detailed specification, states have 
been formalised as shown in Table 1. Moreover, the dynamical relationships between 
these states are shown in Table 2. Note that each connection has a fixed strength, 
except the connection from preparation of b to sensory representation of s2, which is 
adapted over time by the Hebbian learning. More detailed specifications of the dy-
namical relationships are presented below. First it is shown how in a generic manner 
sensor states are generated from world states. 
srs(s1) 
LP3 
sensor_state(s2) world_state(s2) 
world_state(s1) preparation_state(b)  sensor_state(s1) effector_state(b) 
srs(s2) 
ω0 
 ω0 ω1      ω 
ω4 
ω2 ω3 ω5 
LP1 LP2 LP4 
LP5 LP1 
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Table 2. Overview of the connections and their weights 
from states to state weights process LP 
WS(s) SS(s) ω0 sensing world state LP1 
SS(s1) SRS(s1) ω2 representing world state LP2 
SRS(s1), SRS(s2) PS(b) ω3, ω4 preparing action / mirroring action LP3 
PS(b) ES(b) ω5 action execution LP4 
SS(s2), PS(b) SRS(s2) ω1, ω representing observed action / inverse mirroring action LP5 
SRS(s2), PS(b) cs(ω) η, ζ Hebbian learning for inverse mirroring LP6 
 
 
LP1 Generating a sensor state 
If world state s has level V1    and  the sensor state for s has level V2 
then after duration Δt  the sensor state for s will have level V2 + γ [ f(ω0V1) – V2] Δt 
WS(s, V1)  &  SS(s, V2) →   SS(s, V2 + γ [ f(ω0V1) – V2] Δt) 
 
Note that this applies to both s1 and s2. Activation for sensory representation for s1 
has been modelled in a straightforward manner as shown in LP2. 
 
LP2  Sensory representation for a sensor state  
If property s1 is sensed with level V1  and the sensory representation of s1 has 
level  V2. 
then after Δt  the sensory representation of s will have level  V2  + γ [ f(ω2V1) - V2 ]  
Δt. 
 SS(s1, V1) & SRS(s1, V2)  →  SRS(s1, V2 + γ [ f(ω2V1) – V2 ] Δt 
 
Next it is shown how an action preparation for b is generated. This is based on the 
sensory representation of stimulus s1, or based on the sensory representation of s2 
representing an observed action of another agent; in the latter case mirroring takes 
place. Note that the two options are not exclusive. 
 
LP3  Preparing and mirroring an action 
If sensory representation of s1 has level V1,  and  sensory representation of s2 has 
level V2, 
  and  the preparation for b has level V3  
then after Δt the preparation state for b will have level V3 + γ (f(ω3V1, ω4V2) - V3) Δt. 
SRS(s1,V1)  &  SRS(s2,V2)  &  PS(b, V3) →  PS(b, V3 + γ (f(ω3V1, ω4V2) - V3) Δt) 
 
Action execution has been modelled in a straightforward manner as shown in LP4. 
 
LP4  Action execution 
If preparation for b has level V1    and the action execution state for b has level V2 
then after Δt the action execution state for b will have level V2 + γ (f(ω5V1) – V2) Δt. 
PS(b, V1)  &  ES(b, V2)  →   ES(b, V2 + γ (f(ω5V1) – V2) Δt) 
 
Next it is shown in LP5 how the sensory representation for s2 (a mental image of 
an observed action) is generated based on a sensor state for s2 or an action preparation 
for b (or a combination of both). In the latter case inverse mirroring take place. 
 
LP5  Representing a world state and inverse mirroring of an action 
If sensor state of s2 has level V1,  and  preparation of b has level V2, 
  and  the sensory representation of s2 has level V3  
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then after Δt the sensory representation of s2 will have level V3 + γ (f(ω1V1, ωV2) -  
V3) Δt. 
SS(s2,V1)  &  PS(b,V2)  &  SRS(s2, V3) →  SRS(s2, V3 + γ (f(ω1V1, ωV2) - V3) Δt) 
 
Finally, it is shown in LP6 how the Hebbian learning process of the connection from 
preparation state for b to sensory representation s2 of an observed action was mod-
elled. This takes place using the following Hebbian learning rule, with maximal con-
nection strength 1, a learning rate η, and extinction rate ζ (usually taken small):  
 
Δω  = γ [ ηV1V2 (1 - ω) - ζω ] Δt 
 
Here V1 and V2 are (time-dependent) activation levels of the connected nodes, and 
γ  is an adaptation speed factor. In differential equation format it can be written as 
 
ௗω
ௗ௧  = γ [ ηV1V2 (1 - ω) - ζω ]  = γ [ ηV1V2  - (ηV1V2 + ζ) ω ] 
 
A similar Hebbian learning rule can be found in [11], p. 406. By the factor (1 - ω) 
the learning rule keeps the level of ω bounded by 1. When the extinction rate is rela-
tively low, the upward changes during learning are proportional to both V1 and V2 and 
maximal learning takes place when both are 1. Whenever one of them is close to 0, 
extinction takes over, and ω slowly decreases. This is specified as follows: 
 
LP6  Learning for inverse mirroring  
If the sensory representation of stimulus s2 has level V1, 
  and the preparation for b has level V2, 
  and the connection weight from preparation for b to sensory representation of s2 has 
level W, 
then after duration Δt  the connection weight from preparation for b to sensory repre-
sentation of s2 will have level W
 
+ γ [ ηV1V2 (1 - W) - ζW ] Δt. 
SRS(s2, V1)  &  PS(b, V2) & cs(ω, W)  →   cs(ω, W + γ [ ηV1V2 (1 - W) - ζW ] Δt) 
3    Simulation Results 
A number of simulations have been performed with the focus of simulating normal 
functioning and deviant functioning of the model. Normal functioning of the agent 
occurs by parameter settings in which stimulus s1 does not lead to high activation of 
sensory representation of s2 (i.e., no mental image of somebody else performing the 
action is created) in absence of the stimulus s2, although stimulus s2 has occurred 
time and time again in the past. In contrast, deviant functioning occurs by parameter 
setting in which stimulus s1 does lead to high activation of sensory representation of 
s2 under similar circumstances, so in this case a mental image of somebody else per-
forming the action is created. 
In the simulations shown, time is on the horizontal axis and the activation level of 
the state properties is on the vertical axis. The connection strengths between different 
states were initialized with 1 (i.e., ω0 = ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = ω4 = ω5 = 1) and kept fixed 
throughout the simulation, except the connection strength ω which was initialized 
with 0 and adapted over time by the Hebbian learning rule given in LP6 in Section 2. 
Other parameters are set as: ∆t = 0.1, learning rate η = 0.3, extinction rate ζ = 0.2,  
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            Fig. 1. World State for s2          Fig. 2. World State for s1 
 
speed factor λ = 0.5, steepness σ = 5 and threshold τ = 0.5. For the initial duration of 
45 time units the stimulus s2 occurs three times for 5 time units alternatively, i.e., for 
the first 5 time units world state for s2 has value 1 and for the next 15 time units value 
0, and so on (see Fig. 1). During these 45 time units the world state for s1 was kept 0 
(see Fig. 2). This represents the situation in which a person observes somebody else 
performing some action (or bodily change) and the mirroring function of the prepara-
tion neurons makes the person prepare for this action. The fluctuation in the activation 
level of the sensor state is repeating the same pattern between 0.1 to 0.9 as it only 
depends (via LP1) upon the world state for s2, which also is repetitive.  
 
 
              Fig. 3. Preparation State for b                 Fig. 4. Connection Strength ω 
                          (Normal Functioning)                                            (Normal Functioning) 
 
Fig. 3 shows the activation of preparation state PS(b) resulting from the sensory re-
presentation pattern. The slight change in the strength of the connection (inverse mir-
roring) from preparation state PS(b) to sensory representation SRS(s2) (via LP6) shows 
a similar but slightly delayed fluctuating pattern; see Fig. 4. After that for about 30 
time units both world states for s1 and s2 were kept 0, so that the effect of any stimu-
lus on preparation state and execution state becomes zero, as reflected, for example, 
in Fig. 3. For the rest of the simulation, the world state for s2 is kept 0 while the world 
state for s1 is becoming 1 (see Figs 1 and 2). As soon as world state for s1 becomes 1, 
the values of sensor state and its sensory representation increase smoothly and be-
come stable at a high value (of about 0.9). One of the interesting facts (in  
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comparison to the second scenario discussed below) is that, even though a link from 
preparation state to SRS(s2) develops, it is not strong enough to propagate the effect of 
SRS(s1) via PS(b) to SRS(s2), see Fig. 4. Hence SRS(s1)  only has a positive effect on 
the activation levels of the preparation state and execution state of b (shown in Fig. 3), 
and not on SRS(s2). No activation is developed of a mental image SRS(s2) of another 
person performing action b; this shows normal functioning. 
To obtain the deviant behavior of the model, again all parameters were initialized 
with the same values as used for the normal behavior and mentioned earlier in current 
section, except the extinction rate which was taken lower this time: ζ  = 0.01. In this case 
by Hebbian learning the connection from preparation state of b to sensory representation 
of s2 achieves a substantially higher connection strength (see Fig. 6) which also induces 
an upward trend in the fluctuating value of the preparation state for b (see Fig. 5).  
 
 
              Fig. 5. Preparation State for b         Fig. 6. Connection Strength ω 
                          (Deviant Functioning)                     (Deviant Functioning) 
 
This achieved connection strength is sufficient to change the impact of stimulus s1 
on SRS(s2) (see Fig. 8) compared to the impact shown in Fig. 7. Even in the absence 
of the world state for s2, from time 75 onwards, if the world state for s1 occurs, it 
leads to high activation of SRS(s2) (see Fig. 8), which shows that the agent develops a 
mental image of somebody else performing action b. This contrasts the case of normal 
functioning in which case after time point 75 the level of SRS(s2) stays (close to) 0 
(see Fig. 7). 
 
 
  Fig. 7. Sensory Representation for s2          Fig. 8. Sensory Representation for s2 
                   (Normal Functioning)              (Deviant Functioning) 
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4   Mathematical Analysis of the Model 
The equilibrium of the connection strength from preparation state of b to the sensory 
representation of s2 may be found by using the equation for Δω presented in Section 2 
to determine the change in the connection strength after ∆t as follows. An equilibrium 
will occur if Δω = 0, so the equation can be rewritten as 
  
γ [ ηV1V2 (1 - ω) - ζω ] Δt = 0      or     ηV1V2 (1 - ω) - ζω  = 0      or    ߱ ൌ ଵଵାቀ അആೇభೇమቁ
 
 
As  V1V2 ≤ 1, the following is an upper bound for the equilibrium value: 
 
߱ ൑ 1
1 ൅ ቀߞߟቁ
 
 
This expression gives the relation describing the maximum connection strength 
that may be achieved for given values of learning and extinction rates. It shows that 
for a smaller value of the extinction rate compared to the learning rate the connection 
strength will be closer to 1. For the simulation results discussed in Section 3, for the 
second case (deviant functioning) the learning rate was η = 0.3 and the extinction rate 
ζ = 0.01 which means the maximum connection strength which may be achieved is 
0.97. Indeed it was observed that the connection strength indeed becomes stabilized 
just below 0.97. Similarly, for the case of normal functioning, the learning rate was η 
= 0.3 and extinction rate ζ = 0.2.  Indeed the equilibrium was below the 0.6 indicated 
by the above analysis. Note that these are upper bounds resulting from maximal val-
ues 1 continuously for V1 and V2. In practice this will not continuously happen, so the 
strength will stay lower. 
5   Discussion 
One of the recent developments in Neuroscience concerns the notion of a mirror sys-
tem and its functions; e.g., [4], [14], [15], [20]. Cognitive agent models have been 
designed using this notion as a point of departure, and showing its role in various 
high-level cognitive and social capabilities such as prediction, imagination, emotion 
reading, empathic understanding, imitation, and attribution of observed actions; see, 
for example [5], [13], [18]. Mirroring is a process from an observed action or body 
state of another person to the person’s own preparation states. As discussed in [17] 
this involves a mental rotation mapping sensory representations of observed actions of 
other agents onto the representational structures for self-generated actions. This real-
ises a change of perspective from another agent (third-person) to perspective from 
oneself (first-person). Attribution a self-generated action to another agent proceeds  
in the opposite direction, realising a change of perspective from oneself (first-person) 
to another agent (third-person) perspective. This requires inverse mirroring: the  
representational structures for self-generated actions are mapped onto sensory repre-
sentations of an observed action of another agent, thus creating a mental image of 
another agent performing the action. When such a mapping involving reverse mental 
rotation is made, a self-generated action is perceived as observed from a third person 
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perspective. The agent model presented in this paper addresses the issue of false attri-
bution of self-generated actions using such a mechanism. In addition it is shown how 
the mechanism can develop based on Hebbian learning [12], [2], [11]. Note that due 
to the opposite direction, an inverse mirroring process is not covered by cognitive 
agent models based on mirroring, such as descibed in [5], [13], [18]. 
The modelling format used to formally specify the agent model is based on the ex-
ecutable hybrid dynamical modelling language LEADSTO [3]. This hybrid language 
combines executable temporal logical elements [1] and numerical dynamical system 
elements [19]. Although the model can also be specified well in a purely numerical 
format, an advantage of LEADSTO is the possibility to use a logical format to de-
scribe state properties. 
As a next step a validation study can be conducted to compare the agent model’s 
behaviour to real behaviours. The agent model obtained can be used as a basis for 
applications involving realistic, human-like virtual agents in the context of serious or 
nonserious gaming. In the area of virtual stories it can be used to create virtual charac-
ters that react in a less standard but realistic manner. Another possible application is to 
obtain virtual patients in the area of simulation-based training for psychotherapists. 
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